This paper proposes a general equilibrium model that aims at quantifying the distributive effects of anticipated inflation in an incomplete market economy with heterogeneous agents. Based on empirical evidence, this paper assumes a fixed cost to participate in financial markets, which in equilibrium generates a theory of money. Money is a return dominated asset, but also a costless mean to smooth consumption for households who in equilibrium decide to remain outside financial markets.
Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between monetary policy, as measured by inflation, and the wealth distribution. While this issue has been partially addressed in the literature (Erosa & Ventura (2002) [6] , Doepke & Schneider (2006) [5] ), this paper differs for three reasons from the existing literature. Firstly, I focus on long run, anticipated inflation rather than unanticipated inflation as in Doepke & Schneider (2006) [5] . Secondly, I motivate money as in Corbae and Chatterjee (1992) [3] as a costless nominal asset and not via the traditional Cash-In-Advance constraint as in Erosa & Ventura (2002) [6] . One of the contribution of this paper is to introduce this theory of money in a general equilibrium framework with production. Further, this paper models explicitly agents' portfolio choice between nominal and real assets thereby accounting for the stock-holding puzzle. Finally, in this economic environment where money is non neutral, this paper quantifies the distributive effects of monetary policy targets.
The key assumption of this paper, namely the existence of fixed cost to participate in financial markets, is based on empirical evidence from the household finance literature. I argue in this paper that the best hedge against inflation risk is given by access to financial markets. Therefore in order to quantify the distributive effects of inflation, it is key for this paper to account for the empirical evidence from the household finance literature. Two empirical facts seem of particular relevance to the research question, namely the "Engel's Law for liquidity" and the stock-holding puzzle.
Ample empirical evidence suggests the existence of an "Engel's Law for liquidity" : high income individuals use cash for a smaller fraction of their total transactions than low income individuals (Avery et al, 1987 [2] ). Also Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1996) [10] show that the fraction of wealth held in liquid assets decreases with income and wealth. These observations suggest that the liquidity structure of households' portfolio differs significantly and suggests that the burden of inflation is unevenly spread across households.
A key factor behind the heterogeneous liquidity structure of household's portfolio is the stock-holding puzzle, the evidence on the low rates of asset market participation in OECD economies (see Table 1 ). To explain this stylized fact, the microeconometric literature delivered evidence in favour of the fixed cost hypothesis rather than the variable cost hypothesis (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) [15] . Estimates of $US 260 are found to be high enough to explain the non-participation of 2/3 the non-participants (VissingJorgensen, 2002) [15] . The conjecture made in this literature is that information costs act as entry costs and per period market participation costs. Henceforth, participation cost to financial markets are key to understanding the heterogeneity in portfolio holdings and henceforth the exposure of households to inflation. Table 4 in Guiso et al. (2003) [7] -Swedish data is for 1999 .
The literature related most to this paper is mainly composed of two papers. Erosa & Ventura (2002) [6] show that the distributive effects of inflation are guided by the non-linear nature of the inflation tax. Their result depend on the parametrization of the transaction technology (responsiveness of money demand to inflation rate changes and size of inflation tax base), and on the existence of economies of scale in the credit sector. The aggregate impact of inflation in their model is similar to the conclusions from representative agents models. Inflation operates as a regressive consumption tax because the exposure to the inflation tax is dependent on the level of cash purchases. Whereas Erosa & Ventura (2002) [6] motivate money demand for its transactional purposes, in this paper money is motivated as in Corbae & Chatterjee [3] for its virtues as an asset, which is dominated in return, but freely available. In an extension of this paper, the transactional and store of value motive for holding money will be combined.
Further, the literature covered the life cycle perspective of the distributive effects of unanticipated inflation [5] . Similarly to this paper, Doepke & Schneider (2006) [5] focus on quantifying the effect of inflation on the wealth distribution. In their paper, an inflation shock is modelled as a zero sum shock which triggers differentiated responses by agents who are heterogeneous with regard to age and productivity. The surprise inflation shock reduces the real value of nominal claims, and redistributes wealth from lender to borrower. In a nutshell, in consequence of an unanticipated inflation shock young indebted generation reduce their net supply and are net winners, whereas the older generation increases labour supply. On the savings side, the young generation increases its savings for life cycle reasons, whereas the older generation will cut its savings down. At the aggregate level, an increase of 1.3% of savings can be observed, which is qualitatively in line with the results from this paper. Doepke and Schneider (2006) [5] show how inflation can have a large redistributive impact via the life cycle channel. Herein, they present inflation from the perspective of an intergenerational effect which taxes highly retirees and benefits the middle class and young poor. This paper completes the picture on the distributive effect of inflation, firstly by looking at how monetary policy redistributes wealth within a generation, secondly by considering the effect of anticipated inflation, and by modelling money explicitly.
Steady State comparisons show that higher inflation has three direct effects on the allocation, a distributive effect on household's wealth, an effect on aggregate capital (inflation fosters capital accumulation) and on the participation margin of households. These effects are the general equilibrium effects of inflation on agents's asset market participation threshold. In a nutshell, higher inflation lowers the wealth threshold of asset market participation which crowds in capital via the participation margin, thereby lowering the equilibrium interest rate. The lower equilibrium interest rate reduces interest payments of debtors and lowers the return on capital of creditors. Given the technology assumption, lower interest rates induce higher equilibrium wages which benefits on average all agents, given that labor supply is inelastic. At certain participation cost levels, higher average welfare can be reached with higher inflation.
The Model Economy
The outlined monetary economy consists of many, ex-ante identical, infinitely lived agents. Each agent faces idiosyncratic uncertainty with regard to her labour productivity. Asset markets are incomplete and households self-insure against idiosyncratic risks on labour productivity. All households have access to an intertemporal allocation technology which is subject to the inflation tax, and may access a costly intertemporal allocation device which shields them from the inflation tax, and delivers a risk-free return. In equilibrium, in spite of the fact that money is dominated in return, a mass of households will hold money, as long as the participation cost is positive. Conditionally on paying the participation cost, households face an economic environment identical to Aiyagari (1994) [1] . Households have an endogenous outside option from participating in asset markets as they may smooth consumption through money holdings as in Imrohoroglu (1992) [9] .
In this richer setting of intertemporal optimization and portfolio choice, this monetary economy features three types of agents. Hand-to-mouth consumers, nominal consumption smoothers and "traditional" consumption smoother. Also money will be non-neutral and the Mundell-Tobin is accounted for. Monetary policy will affect households asymmetrically depending on their financial wealth and the means in which their wealth is stored.
A key implication of the fixed participation cost, is that for each choice of wealth transfer, the return net of the participation cost will be heterogeneous along the wealth distribution. For instance, small borrowers/ lenders face higher per unit cost than large borrowers/lenders.
Preferences and Technology
At any given time there is a unit mass of ex-ante identical, infinitely lived households. Households differ in their labour efficiency s t ∈ S = [s min , s max ] ⊂ R + and in their financial wealth x t ∈ X = [x min , x max ] ⊂ R. They independently draw their labour efficiency from a stochastic process defined on a measurable space with transition function given by the Markov matrix Γ.
There is one composite good produced according to an aggregate production function F (K t , N t ), where K t is the aggregate capital stock that depreciates at rate δ and N t is the aggregate labour in efficiency units. The composite good can either be used for consumption or for investment purposes and technology is guided by the following assumptions.
, F satisfies (i) constant return to scale (ii) diminishing marginal returns with respect to the two factors, (iii)
The preferences of a household are given by the expected value of the discounted sum of utility derived from consumption.
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and c i t individual consumption level at time t. I make the following assumption on preferences.
Assumption A2. For any given c i t , U (·) is stricly increasing, concave and differentiable.
Central Bank
The Central Bank sets µ t the growth rate of the nominal money stock, which is denoted byM t . It is assumed that the central bank has perfect control over the inflation rate. The law of motion of the aggregate nominal money stock reads:
Seigniorage revenues are redistributed in a lump sum fashion to all households. Furthermore, it is assumed that government spending G t amounts to nil. The government budget constraint expressed in real terms reads as follows.
After rearrangements, we get the following expression for lump sum transfers.
Money is supplied by the central bank, which fixes the money supply growth rate exogenously, such that the inflation target is attained. Seigniorage revenues from money creation are redistributed via lump-sum transfer. The central bank perfectly controls the inflation rate which maps into the money growth rate. Therefore, the inflation dealt with in this model, is long-run anticipated inflation.
Markets
I assume competitive factor markets. The rental rate on capital is denoted by r t and the real wage per efficiency unit by w t .
In this model households decide whether to participate in the asset market which entails a fixed cost, or whether to solely participate in the money market. The additional difference beyond the participation cost is that in the asset market, she can borrow, whereas the state space for the money market participants is bounded below at 0, due to the very nature of money.
The purchase of a financial contract in period t of value a t+1 means that the household entered into a financial contract with a firm which promises a t+1 (1 + r t+1 ) in period t + 1. For this contract to be implemented or for the financial agency to take place and repayment to be assured, it is assumed that a fixed cost q is levied onto the household. This is independent on whether she is lending or borrowing.
Alternatively, household can store their wealth in money. Holding a unit of money in period t of value m t+1 exposes the household to inflation risk, as in period t + 1 the real value of the real wealth transfer is m t+1 1+πt , where π t denotes the inflation rate.
Decision Problems
The timing of the economy is (i) idiosyncratic shocks s t are drawn, (ii) capital and labour are rented and production takes place, (iii) household decide on asset market participation and on borrowing/savings decisions, and (iv) consumption of the composite good takes place. In the following, I will focus on steady state equilibria, where w = w t , r = r t and π = π t
Households
The recursive formulation of households' decision problem denotes any period t variable x t by x and any period t + 1 by x ′ .
In addition to prices, the household's budget correspondence B 1,x,s,1 ′ depends on its exogenous state s and its beginning of period asset holdings a and money holdings m. Moreover it depends on its decision to participate to the asset market 1 ′ a =0 ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 ′ a =0 = 1 denotes the decision of the household to participate in the asset market, and 1 ′ a =0 = 0 the decision to remain outside the asset market.
1. If a household has productivity s and has been outside the asset market 1 a =0 = 0 and decides to remain outside the asset market 1 ′ a =0 = 0, then
If a household has productivity s and has been outside the asset market 1 a =0 = 0 and decides to enter the asset market 1 ′ a =0 = 1, then
If a household has productivity s and has been participating in the asset market 1 a =0 = 1 and decides to remain in the asset market 1 ′ a =0 = 1, then
If a household has productivity s and has been participating in the asset market 1 a =0 = 1 and decides to exit the asset market 1 ′ a =0 = 0, then
to be all possible (a, m, s, 1) tuples. Given that only agents participating in the asset market can hold debt, and that money can only be held in positive amounts,
Reduction of the state space
Considering the below Lemmas, the state space can be considerably reduced. I introduce a variable which denotes financial wealth, denoted by x ∈ X. 
The state space of asset market participants Y in = {X × S × 1}. For asset market outsiders, given Lemma A2 Y out = {X out × S × 1}.
Setup of household's decision problem
Let v x,s (π, r, w) denote the expected lifetime utility of a household with financial wealth x and productivity s, that faces prices r, w and an inflation rate of π and let v(π, r, w) be the vector {v x,s (π, r, w) : (x, s) ∈ S × X} in the set V of all continuous functions v : S × X → R.
Below I reformulate the household optimization problem in terms of a vector valued operator (T V )(r, w, π) = (T V )(x, s; r, w, π) : (x, s) ∈ S × X, which yields the maximum lifetime utility achievable.
Definition A1. For v ∈ V, let (T V )(x, s; π, w, r) be defined as follows:
1. For X ∈ X out and B out ≡ B 0,x,s,0 (π, r, w) ∪ B 0,x,s,1 (π, r, w) (See household decision problem 2 and 1),
2. For X ∈ X in and B in ≡ B 1,x,s,0 (π, r, w) ∪ B 1,x,s,1 (π, r, w) (See household decision problem 3 and 4),
3. For X ∈ X out and B out ≡ B 0,x,s,0 (π, r, w) ∪ B 0,x,s,1 (π, r, w)
Because certain actions involve discrete choice, T (v ⋆ ) delivers an optimal policy correspondence instead of a function. The measurable selection theorem (Theorem 7.6 Stokey & Lucas(1989)) guarantees the existence of measurable policy functions for consumption c(x, s), asset holdings a ′ (x, s), real money holdings m ′ (x, s), and the participation decision 1 a =0 (x, s). The policy functions can be mapped from the wealth policy functions x ′ (x, s) given the participation thresholds.
Characterization of the participation decision
The decision to enter or exit asset markets being the key feature of this model, let's establish results as to how the decision to enter or exit varies with a household's level of financial wealth and productivity.
Let's characterize the participation decision in terms of a participation set P
where
Firms
The representative firm faces a static optimization problem and maximizes profits. The necessary conditions for profit maximization imply following prices for capital and labour.
where w t , and r t denote the real wage and real interest rate.
Steady state equilibrium
Definition A2. Given a borrowing limit a min , a positive fixed cost q and an exogenous money growth rate µ ∈ Π, a stationary monetary competitive equilibrium is a set of strictly positive prices w, r, strictly positive quantities of aggregate capital K and aggregate real money M , decision rules a ′ (x, s), m ′ (x, s), 1 a =0 (x, s) and a probability distribution λ(x, s) such that:
1. The prices (w, r) satisfy the static optimization problem of the representative firm.
The policy functions
3. The probability distribution λ(x, s) is a stationary distribution s.t.
4. The asset market clears.
The money market clears.
The commodity market clears.
The Central bank budget constraint is satisfied.
By Walras law, the commodity market will clear given money and capital market equilibrium. Moreover since labor supply is inelastic, the labour market clears by construction.
Existence of a steady state is given under some restrictions on prices. Since K is strictly positive, the measure of asset market participants needs to be non-empty. For this to be always true, a constraint on the steady state inflation is required.
Lemma A3. For a steady state to exist such that K > 0, given that q ≥ 0, the choice set of the Central Bank needs to be restricted. By applying a no-arbitrage argument, it needs to be imposed that π ∈ Π, where Π = (− r−q/x ′ 1+r−q/x ′ ; π max ). The Friedman Rule can by construction not be implemented in this model.
A steady state in this economy has the property that the interest rate is lower than the rate of time preference. In fact in this economy agents have a motive to do precautionary savings, as they not only smooth consumption across time, but they attempt to insure themselves across states.
Calibration
To quantify accurately the distributive effects of long run inflation, the calibration of the model should deliver statistics that match the US wealth distribution, the household debt structure and finally the two aforementioned stylized facts from the household finance literature 1.
The time period of the model is assumed to be one year. Preferences are of the CRRA type U (c t ) = (c i t ) 1−σ 1−σ with a risk aversion parameter of σ = 2. The technology parameter α is chosen so as to match the labor share of 0.64 in the US data. The depreciation rate δ and the discount factor β are set to match the annual investment to capital ratio of 3. This generates an interest rate of about 4%. These parameters are standard in the macroeconomic literature. Table 3 : Labor productivity transition matrix s t = 1.27 1.00 0.78 Table 4 : Labor efficiency levels
The earnings process is a three state Markov chain, and Table 4 displays the  shock values and Table 3 the transition matrix. The income process is taken from Diaz, Pijoan-Mas & Rios-Rull (2002) [4] . Their income process results from an AR (1) process with an autocorrelation of 0.6 and a coefficient of variation of 0.2 which is discretized using the Tauchen (1986) method . Table 5 : Baseline Calibration for a 1 year model period
Description
As can be seen in Table 5 the model matches relatively well the Gini indices. These results are in contrast to the Gini indices usually obtained in Aiyagari (1994) [1] type of economies. Usually these models deliver Gini of wealth of .38 [1] . Problematic is here potentially the way Gini indices are calculated given that, we allow for negative asset holdings and wealth holdings. Furthermore, the model matches well the proportion of the population in debt in the data. I should therefore capture well the impact of a change in long run inflation on household's wealth and thereby quantify the distributive effects of inflation on debtors and creditors.
The model performs relatively well at matching the amount of unsecured debt relative to income. Using 1999 PSID data, Hurst Willen (2007) [8] report that the mean of unsecured debt held by households amounted to 36 % of their average income. This reinforces the fact that this model accounts well for the debt structure of the economy.
In terms of matching evidence on asset market participation, the model doesn't perform well. Compared to the empirical evidence of 50 % of financial market participation in the US data, the benchmark model delivers an asset market participation rate of 92%. Moreover, this is achieved with a fixed cost that is three times higher than according to the empirical evidence. For the fixed cost, I take the estimate of Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) [15] of $US 260 and divide it by annual median annual household income in the US which amounts $52000 1 . According to Vissing-Jorgensen, [15] , this level of fixed cost explains 75% of non-participation. In the model economy, even with a cost three times as high, the model can under this baseline calibration only explain under a fifth of non-participation. Problematic is here the fact, the household literature considers only creditors when accounting for asset market participation. In the above model, asset market participants which go short are accounted for in the measure of asset market participants, which is not the case in the household finance literature (more on this soon).
For the M1/GNP ratio, the estimate is taken from Erosa & Ventura (2002) [6] . This ratio is adjusted for the fact that a substantial fraction of US currency is not held by US residents 2 . Under this calibration, money for sole store of value purposes accounts for 0.6% of GDP. How well the model performs here is difficult to judge, as we only motivate money for its store of value motive and not for the transaction motive.
Overall the model performs well in mimicking the debt structure of the economy and the heterogeneity of household financial wealth and asset holdings, however it fails to account for the stock holding puzzle, and consequently in accounting for money aggregate measure M1. Figure 1 plots the share of agents remaining outside the financial market, who smooth consumption with real money holdings. When the participation cost is high, higher equilibrium inflation rate crowds households into the asset market. This crowding in effect is stronger, the higher the participation cost.
This non-participation behaviour shows that in order to match the empirical evidence on limited stock market participation, the fixed cost argument is not leading to satisfactory results in this class of models. One feature of the stock market participation puzzle is that a sizeable share of agents with sizeable savings remain outside the asset market. Due to the fact that in the outlined model, the decision to participate in asset market is a function of financial wealth, an additional friction would be required to achieve a satisfactory model prediction.
More effort will be put in understanding how the empirical measures of non participation are obtained, as from Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) [15] it seems that it considers asset market participants as agents with positive financial asset holdings. In the above model, if we were to consider agents with negative asset holdings as financial market outsider, the above model would actually achieve steady state statistics of asset market participation which are in line with the empirical literature. The existence of participation cost gives rise to the Mundell-Tobin effect, via the asset market participation decision. As Figure 2 shows, an increase in the equilibrium money growth rate crowds agents out of the money market, by increasing the incentive of engaging in real activities and participating in financial markets. The crowding in effect of monetary policy leads to an increase in capital demand, which lowers the return on capital.
Tobin effect
When comparing steady states, one result of this paper show that "anticipated inflation is likely to raise (lower) the money rate of interest by less than the rate of inflation (deflation) itself" [13] . As stressed by Mundell (1963) [13] , it is more consistent with Fisher's empirical observations than his own theory. The direct consequence of this effect is that monetary policy affects the equilibrium allocation.
Welfare
In terms of welfare analysis, I evaluate the desirability of policies by evaluating the following expression:
where υ denotes the expected value function if households over wealth. Given that all agents are weighted equally, it is a utilitarian welfare criterion that measures exante welfare. Based on this measure i estimate the variation in consumption under a given money supply growth that makes households indifferent between the economy defined by the proposed monetary policy and the benchmark economy. The variation in consumption is denotes by ω. The fact that in the absence of participation cost the effect of higher inflation rate improves welfare shows that some numerical inaccuracies remain to be addressed (more on this soon).
Distributive effects of inflation
In the outlined economy, inflation transfers wealth via three mechanisms. Firstly, inflation taxes agents who smooth consumption with nominal assets. Secondly, inflation indirectly affects asset market participants, by crowding households in the asset market, and thereby lowering (increasing) the wealth of households with long (short) positions on the asset market. Finally, the crowding effect of capital tends to increase wages, which benefits all agents.
The below Figure 4 plots the Consumption Equivalent effect of increasing inflation target from 2 to 4 percent as a function of individual financial wealth level given the benchmark participation cost. Note that no distribution is considered here. The distributive effects of inflation induced via the endogenous wealth distribution are not taken into account yet. This plot solely compares the steady state indirect utility levels attainable to households with a particular level of wealth. In order to quantitatively disentangle the two mechanisms, one need to account for changes in distribution and for changes in policy functions. Steady state comparisons can be very misleading. In a later stage, transitions across steady states will be computed. (work in progress). As of now, first results show that increased inflation lowers wealth inequalities as can be seen in Figure 5 . 
Transition
In order to deliver a complete picture of the distributive effects of changing long run inflation, I intend to account for welfare changes along the transition path between steady states. To do so, I will formulate the above model in nominal terms and solve the above model along a transition path.
Introduce Cash-In-Advance constraint
The model will be extended so as to incorporate the transactional motive for holding money. The aim of this extension is firstly to explicitly relate this model to the literature (Erosa & Ventura, 2002) , and secondly deliver a complete picture of the redistributive effects of inflation when inflation is not only considered as a tax on wealth but also as a tax on consumption.
Microfoundation for the participation cost
Algorithm 2 Transition across steady states (in progress) Exogenous change in fixed cost q or inflation rate π
Step 1: Assume transition will take T periods.
Step 2: Compute initial steady state at t = 0, {V t , v Step 3: Guess a sequence of {K t } T t=0 , where K 0 is the aggregate capital of the initial steady state, and K T is the aggregate capital of the terminal steady state. Also guess a sequence of aggregate money supply {M t } T t=0 , where M 0 is the aggregate money stock at the initial steady state, and M T is the aggregate money stock at the terminal steady state.
Step 5: Solve the problem by backward induction and obtain a sequence of value function {V t } T −1 t=0 and the associated policy functions {c t , a t , m t } T −1 t=0 .
Step 6: Given the policy functions, reconstruct the sequence of transition functions and since we know the λ t=0 , the whole sequence of measures can be computed {λ t (w, s)} T −1 t=0
Step 7: Check market clearing for the capital and money market for each period t. If max 1≤t≤T |A t − K t | < ǫ, stop else go to step 8.
Step 8: Update initial guess for {K} 
